We study an auction where two licenses to operate on a new market are sold, and winning bidders finance their bids on the debt market. Higher bids imply higher debts, which affects product market competition. When debt induces firms to compete less aggressively, retail prices are higher than in a model without debt, but retail profits are competed away in the auction. When debt induces firms to compete more aggressively, retail prices are lower than in a model without debt. Retail profits are not competed away in the auction, due to endogenous credit rationing.
Introduction
Over the last decade, license auctions in the US and Europe sparked a huge interest from both academics and the general public. In the US, the FCC auctioned licenses to use the electromagnetic spectrum for personal communication services. Between July 1994 and July 1998, 16 auctions were held, where 5,893 licenses were sold. Total revenues amounted to $22.9 billion dollars. These auctions, held in 9 countries, raised over $100 billion, or over 1.5% of GDP. The revenue per inhabitant differed greatly per country. Currently, European countries prepare to auction off the 3G expansion band. 4 Traditional auction theory 5 may not be the most appropriate framework to study these auctions. Indeed, Klemperer (2002b) argues that in analyses of license auctions based on this literature, often too much attention is given to technicalities concerning asymmetric information, and too little attention to market structure and industrial organization aspects. Traditional models typically assume that for each bidder the value of the object that is being auctioned is fixed and given. In a license auction, this is often not the case. Here, firms bid on the right to compete on a market. The willingness to pay for that right will depend on the characteristics of the aftermarket (see e.g. Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2003) .
One striking aspect of license auctions is that winning firms often have to take on debt to be able to finance their bid (see e.g. The Economist, 2002) . From the industrial organization literature, it is well-known that the competitive behavior of a firm, and therefore its profit, is affected by the amount of debt that it holds. More debt induces a firm to compete either more aggressively (Brander and Lewis, 1986) , or less aggressively (Showalter 1995) , 1 Cramton and Schwartz (2000) ; for more on the design of these auctions, see e.g. McAfee and McMillan (1996), or McMillan (1994) .
2 See Van Damme (2002), or Börgers and Dustmann (2003) . 3 Klemperer (2002a) . 4 See The Economist (2005). 5 For a survey see Wolfstetter (1996) , or Klemperer (1999) .
depending on the exact specification of the model. Thus, not only does willingness to pay in the auction depend on the characteristics of the aftermarket, but the amount paid in the auction also directly affects the characteristics of the aftermarket.
In this paper, we model this issue. Two licenses to operate on some new market are being auctioned. Firms have symmetric information. The two winners of the auction will finance their bids on a competitive debt market, and then compete on the product market. Our main results are the following. In a benchmark model in which firms have sufficient internal funds, the output market is not affected by the outcome of the auction.
Future retail profits are competed away in the auction. In our model, firms do not have internal funds and finance their bids through debt. If debt induces firms to compete more aggressively in the output market, retail prices are lower than they would be without debt financing. This implies that retail profits are lower. However, we show that in this case profits are not competed away in the auction, so firms make strictly positive expected net profits. Instead, if debt induces firms to compete less aggressively on the output market, retail prices are higher than they would be without debt financing. This implies that retail profits are higher. As in the benchmark case, these profits are competed away in the auction. We thus show that if debt makes the output market more competitive, then it makes the auction less competitive, in the sense that expected net profits are higher. If debt makes the output market less competitive, it does not affect the competitiveness of the auction.
The fact that retail profits are not always competed away in the auction stage is due to endogenous credit rationing. Winning bidders, even though they make positive expected net profits, will not be outbid. A higher bid would require a higher debt level. If a higher debt level induces firms to compete more aggressively on the product market, then at some point, a higher debt level reduces the expected repayment to debtholders. Therefore, the supply curve of debt is backward bending. Thus, a firm would be willing to bid more if it could obtain funding for such a bid, but it is not able to. If a higher debt level induces firms to compete less aggressively on the product market, then more debt always implies a higher expected repayment to debtholders. Hence, in that case, we do not have credit rationing, and profits are competed away in the auction.
With respect to license auctions, one of the main concerns in the popular press is that their use will increase retail prices. Firms will recoup the costs of licenses by simply adding a mark-up to retail prices, the argument goes. Of course, this argument is invalid, as prices paid at an auction are simply sunk costs. In our model, higher fees may even lead to lower prices. This is due to the strategic effect of debt: as firms take on more debt, they will compete more aggressively on the product market. Thus, retail prices in our model are lower than in a model with internal funds, or in a beauty contest.
6
In our paper, we primarily focus on the first case sketched above, where debt induces firms to compete more aggressively. After an overview of some related literature in the next section, we present that model in section 3. We do not specify the exact mode of competition. We only impose some properties of the equilibrium profits of the competition stage, which are satisfied in many common competition models. In section 4 we solve the model. In section 5 we summarize our main results, and in Section 6 we give a numerical example. Section 7 considers the case in which debt induces firms to compete less aggressively. Section 8 concludes.
Related literature
As argued in the introduction, a firm's bid in a license auction will depend on the characteristics of the aftermarket. A number of papers study auctions in which the utility of the losing bidders depends, either positively or negatively, on the identity of the winner(s) Moldovanu [1996, 2000] , , 1999 ], Das Varma [2002 ). This will affect the equilibrium bids. An application of such auctions with externalities is that of incumbent firms and potential entrants bidding on the exclusive right to use an innova- 6 We also made this argument, but only intuitively, in Haan and Toolsema (2000) .
tion.
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Goeree extends Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) by allowing bidders to use their bid as a signal of some private information that affects competition on the aftermarket. Maasland and Onderstal (2007) study an auction with financial externalities. In this case, the utility of the losing bidders depend on the payment of the winner, rather than his identity.
Other papers explicitly study how license auctions affect the aftermarket. Hoppe et al. (2006) show that auctioning more licenses need not result in a more competitive aftermarket. If the number of licenses is lower than the number of incumbents already in the market, each incumbent has an incentive to free ride on the preemption effort of others. If the number of licenses is equal to the number of incumbents, this is no longer the case and entrants are less likely to obtain a license. In Janssen (2006) , two licenses are being auctioned. Firms that obtain a license may either set a low or a high price on the aftermarket.
In his set-up, the only equilibrium consistent with forward induction is one in which firms set high prices on the aftermarket, and submit bids that equal the resulting aftermarket profits. Hence, an auction would result in higher aftermarket prices than a beauty contest would. In Janssen and Karamychev (2007) , the auction selects the least risk-averse bidder.
This implies that, with price setting in the aftermarket, the winner of a license would set a higher price than a randomly selected firm would. With quantity setting, it would set a higher quantity than a randomly selected firm would, and hence price would be lower.
Different from most of the literature on auctions with externalities, we assume no informational asymmetries between bidders, a modelling choice that Hoppe et al. (2006) also make. Also, in most of that literature, only the identity of the winner of the auction has an effect on the aftermarket. In our model, it is the payment of the winners that is important. In that sense, our model is closer to Maasland and Onderstal (2007) . However, in our model, the utility of a winner in the auction depends on the payments of the other winner, whereas in Maasland and Onderstal (2007) , the utility of the losers depends on the payment of the winner. Also, we explicitly model the source of the financial externalities.
7 For a survey of patent licensing see e.g. Kamien (1992) .
This is similar to Goeree (2003) , but the mechanism is different. In his paper, it is the signalling of private information. In our paper, it is the strategic effect of debt. The manner in which the auction affects retail prices in our model is somewhat similar to that in Janssen and Karamychev (2007) . In their paper, the auction selects the least risk-averse bidders, and less risk-averse firms concentrate more on states of the world with high profits. In our paper, an auction implies that firms have to take on more debt, and more debt implies that firms, through limited liability, concentrate more on states of the world with high profits.
In a seminal article, Brander and Lewis (1986) study a model in which firms hold debt and compete in Cournot fashion. Firms face uncertainty with respect to e.g. the level of marginal costs. After output decisions have been made, uncertainty is resolved. Each firm has limited liability. If retail profits fall short of its debt level, the firm is simply not able to repay its debt, and hence has a zero net profit. This will be the case if marginal costs turn out to be high. A firm that maximizes net profits will thus focus on cases with low marginal costs when making its output decision. This implies that it will choose a higher output level than it would without limited liability. In other words, in this context, more debt induces firms to compete more aggressively. Yet, we may also have that more debt induces firms to compete less aggressively (Showalter, 1995) . This is the case with Bertrand competition and demand uncertainty. Then, debts cannot be repaid if demand turns out to be low. In setting their price, firms thus focus on states with high demand, which implies that they set higher prices than they would do in a case without debt.
A few papers study other aspects of the interplay between debt and auctions. Chowdhry and Nanda (1993) also study the strategic role of debt in an auction -but in a context entirely different from ours. They study a takeover contest, in which many raiders bid to take over a firm. Clayton and Ravid (2002) study the effect of the initial debt level of a firm on its bidding behavior in the US FCC auctions. They find that, as debt levels increase, firms tend to reduce their bids. Note however that they study the amount of debt a firm already has when the auction takes place. We study the amount of debt a firm has to take on as a consequence of winning the auction. Moreover, in our model, the amount of debt is endogenously determined. In their model, the debt level that a firm holds prior to the auction is simply subtracted from its valuation for the good that is being auctioned. In Zheng's (2001) model, bidders differ with respect to the amount of funds that they have.
Firms with lower funds have to take on higher debts upon winning the auction. That implies that these bidders are willing to risk more, and therefore bid more aggressively. It also implies that the winners of the auction are exactly those bidders that are more likely to go bankrupt. In Zheng (2001) , limited liability therefore has a direct effect on bidding behavior. In our model, the effect is indirect, and operates via the competition stage that takes place after the auction.
The model
We consider a three-stage model. In the first stage, the auction stage, N > 2 bidders compete in a sealed-bid license auction, where winning bidders pay their own bid. Bidders are ex ante identical. The two highest bidders obtain a license to operate in a new market.
Without loss of generality, the highest bidder will be denoted firm 1 and the second highest bidder will be denoted firm 2. Their bids are denoted b 1 and b 2 . In the case of ties, winners will be decided by coin toss. In stage 2, the debt stage, the two winning firms finance their bids on a perfectly competitive debt market. Firm i obtains an amount b i to pay for its bid, against the promise of repaying d i at the end of the game. We assume that the auctioneer commits to selling two licenses.
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In stage 3, the competition stage, the two winning firms compete on the output market, where they face uncertainty. After firms have chosen their strategic actions, uncertainty is resolved, consumers make their purchase decisions and, if possible, debts are repaid. Without loss of generality, we assume no discounting.
8 Rather than the timing that we use, one may also assume that firms obtain a line of credit prior to the auction. For the outcome of our model, this is immaterial. With a competitive debt market, the required repayments are fully determined by the equilibrium bids. In the exact same way, banks competing to offer a line of credit will condition required repayments on the winning bids that will ultimately prevail.
The strategic effect of debt may work in two opposite directions. More debt may result in more aggressive competition, that is, higher quantities and lower prices. This is the case, for example, with Cournot competition and uncertainty about either marginal cost or demand (Brander and Lewis, 1986) , and with Bertrand competition and uncertainty about marginal cost (Showalter, 1995) . However, it may also be the case that more debt results in less aggressive competition, that is, in lower quantities and higher prices. This is the case, for example, with Bertrand competition and uncertainty about demand (Showalter, 1995) . In this paper, we mainly focus on the former case. The latter case is solved in section 7. For simplicity, we assume in our model that firms can only take on debt to finance their bids in the license auction. Hence, we do not allow firms to take on debt solely for strategic reasons, as they do in the literature referred to above.
In the remainder of this section, we give a detailed description of the three stages of the model: the auction stage, the debt stage, and the competition stage. We describe these stages in the same order as we solve the model: by backward induction, starting with the last stage. We then give a formal definition of the equilibrium concept that we use. We end with some technicalities.
Competition stage In this stage, the two firms that have won the auction in stage 1, and managed to obtain funding, compete on the output market. Products are substitutes.
Demand functions are downward sloping. Firms compete by simultaneously choosing an action a, which may refer to either price p or quantity q. Let a i ≥ 0 denote the action chosen by firm i. Retail profits of each firm will depend on the actions chosen by both firms, and the realization of some random variable ω. Firm is retail profits are denoted π i (a i , a j , ω), which is continuous and strictly concave in a i .
The uncertainty reflected by ω may concern e.g. the marginal costs firms will incur, or the level of demand that they will face. We use the convention that higher values of ω correspond to less favorable states of the world in which, ceteris paribus, retail profits are lower: 
the firm makes positive retail profits, but these are insufficient to repay the debt d i . In that case, all retail profits will be paid to the debtholders, and the firm's net profits are zero.
We denote the expected net profits of firm i, i.e. after the repayment of its debt, as
For the competition subgame, we make the usual assumption that |∂
This condition is sufficient for uniqueness of the equilibrium of this subgame (see e.g. Tirole, 1988, p. 226 ). We will denote the unique equilibrium of the competition subgame as assume a perfectly competitive debt market, firms can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to debtholders. For ease of exposition, we will writeω
Here, the subscript i denotes that these debtholders lend to firm i. The expected net profits
The expected net profits of firm i at this stage can be written as
Firms 1 given what will occur in the competition stage.
Auction stage In the auction stage, N > 2 firms submit a bid to obtain a license.
To focus on the effect of debt financing, we assume that firms are a priori identical. This also implies that efficiency is not an issue in this auction. We assume that the auctioneer commits to sell two licenses. Note that this also implies that a firm that is able to secure financing will not obtain a license if the other winning bidder is unable to do so. Without such a commitment, a firm could simply submit a bid in the auction that is so high that the debt market is only willing to finance that bid if the other firm does not obtain financing.
A firm is then able to effectively shut any competitor out of the market and obtain a monopoly. The auctioneer wants to exclude that possibility.
In case ties occur, we define T as the number of firms that have submitted the same bid as the second-highest bidder:
Note that the highest bidder may also be among these. Given the vector of bids, the probability of obtaining a license for firm k now equals
and we have
with
Equilibrium concept Putting together all the elements of the three subgames, we can now define the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the full game as follows: 
for i = 1, 2 and j = i, and (1); 2. Equilibrium at the debt stage:
for i = 1, 2 and j = i, and (2); 3. Equilibrium at the auction stage:
. , B N ) as defined in (4).
Further technicalities There are cases in which a firm cannot possibly make strictly positive profits. As the amount of debt d i that a firm holds increases, there is a point where it is impossible for firm i to make strictly positive net profits regardless of the action a i that it chooses, even if we are in the most favorable state of the world, so if ω = ω. Formally,
. For firm i to be able to make strictly positive expected profits, we need d i <d i (d j ). If this is not satisfied, then any action a i will yield a zero profit. For technical convenience, we assume that for any
. Thus, the firm will choose the same action that it would choose with the highest d i that could still yield positive profits.
We restrict attention to competition subgames for which the equilibrium satisfies three properties discussed below. In section 6, we show that the equilibrium in the Hotelling model with cost uncertainty has these properties. In the working paper version of this paper, we show that the same is true for Cournoy and differentiated Bertrand competition with cost uncertainty and linear demand, and also for Cournot competition with demand uncertainty and linear demand (Haan and Toolsema, 2006) .
First consider an increase in the debt level of a firm's competitor. For our analysis, we require that this has an unambiguous effect on the firm's retail profits, independent of the realization of the random variable ω.
Property 1 The derivative
has the same sign for all ω, d i .
Second, suppose that both firms have the same debt level d. We will refer to such a case as one with a common debt level. We require a similar property to the one above for a change in that common debt level:
has the same sign for all ω.
Third, for the bulk of this paper, we will consider the case in which more debt induces firms to compete more aggressively. We will show that the following property is necessary and sufficient for that to hold: In section 7, we consider the opposite case, in which more debt makes firms compete less aggressively.
Solving the model 4.1 Preliminaries
To derive the equilibrium of our model, we need some preliminary results, which we establish in a number of lemmas. All proofs are in the appendix. In each lemma and theorem that follows, we impose Properties 1, 2, and 3 on the equilibrium profits of the competition stage.
First, we show that with quantity competition, more debt induces a firm to compete more aggressively, in the sense that its best-reply function shifts upwards. With more debt, a given output of the competitor will lead to a higher output for this firm. Also, with price competition, more debt induces a firm to compete more aggressively, but that now implies that its best-reply function shifts downwards. With more debt, a given price of the competitor will lead to a lower price for this firm (Lemma 1). As a result, we have that a firm's retail profit decreases if its competitor takes on higher debt (Lemma 2). Formally, denote the best-reply function of firm i as β i (a j ; d i ).
Lemma 1 Having more debt induces a firm to compete more aggressively:
Lemma 2 An increase in a firm's debt level decreases the competitor's equilibrium retail
profits:
It will also prove useful to consider the case in which both firms have the same level of debt d, and to study the effect of an increase in that common debt level.
we can defined as that value of the common debt level for which firms are not able to make positive profits, regardless of the value of ω. Thus, π * D) . Define the expected retail profits of firm i as follows:
Firms are a priori identical, so whenever 
Now consider the expected revenues for debtholders:
Lemma 4 An increase in the amount of debt that a firm holds, decreases the expected revenue for debtholders of the other firm:
The intuition is as follows. From Lemma 2, for every realization of ω the retail profits of a firm decrease if its competitor's debt level increases. Hence, the probability that the firm will be able to fully repay its debt decreases, as do the profits that debtholders can capture in case the firm cannot fully repay its debt.
The effect of an increase in a firm's debt level on its own debtholders' expected repayment is ambiguous. Yet, we can derive a weaker result that is sufficient for our purposes.
We will refer to the common debt level that maximizes debtholder expected revenues as
If this value is not unique, we define d R as the smallest d for which the maximum of
Suppose that a firm's competitor has a debt level that is equal to d R , while the firm itself has a lower debt level. In that case, if we increase the amount of debt of this firm to d R as well, we can show that the expected revenues of the debtholders of this firm increase:
Equilibrium
We now turn to the equilibrium of the model.
Theorem 1 If the competition subgame has Properties 1, 2, and 3, then an equilibrium of
our model is given by:
Theorem 2 In the equilibrium described in Theorem 1, firms make strictly positive expected net profits.
In an auction with internal funds, symmetric bidders and full information, profits are competed away in Bertrand-like fashion. In this auction with debt, however, this is not true. Once the bidding reaches b R , bids will no longer increase. Suppose that a firm does submit a bid higher than b R . To finance such a bid, the debt this firm has to take on is necessarily higher than d R . But more debt induces a firm to compete more aggressively on the product market, which implies that the expected repayment to debtholders is lower.
With higher debt, but a lower expected repayment, expected debtholder profits would then decrease. Since these are zero in (b R , d R ), this implies that any bidder outbidding b R will not be able to find financing.
In effect, we thus have a backward-bending credit supply curve.
9
In general, such a curve may be caused by adverse selection or moral hazard. With moral hazard, as the interest rate r increases, firms are inclined to take on riskier projects. At some point, this effect becomes so strong that the expected repayment to debtholders decreases with an increase in r, causing the supply of credit to decrease. A similar argument applies in our model. As the winning firms take on more debt, they compete more aggressively, which implies that expected retail profits decrease, at some point leading to a lower expected repayment to debtholders. The reason that in our model expected net profits are positive thus boils down to credit rationing. The equilibrium of our model occurs at the maximum of the backward bending credit supply curve. Submitting higher bids would require a higher expected repayment to debtholders, which is simply not feasible. Hence firms are still willing to submit higher bids, but are not able to do so since they are denied access to the credit market when they do. Thus, if debt makes the output market more competitive, then it makes the auction less competitive, in the sense that expected net profits are higher.
We can also show: Hence, provided that the condition in the theorem is satisfied, our model has a unique symmetric equilibrium, in which all firms submit the same bid. The winning bidders choose the same debt level. That debt level is the common debt level that maximizes expected repayment to the debtholders. Yet, debtholders' net profits are driven to zero.
9 See e.g. Freixas and Rochet (1998, section 5.2) . 
In the figure, R is decreasing for d slightly smaller thand, which implies that d R <d.
Intuitively, this can be seen as follows. Suppose that we have d =d. In that case, all retail profits flow to the debtholders. Now suppose that we decrease d slightly tod − ε. Retail profits then increase for all possible realizations of ω. This is good news for debtholders.
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Hence, R then increases.
The equilibrium of our model is now easy to see. First note that all firms submit the same bid in equilibrium. Suppose that all firms bid some b 0 < b R . The two winning firms are then able to find financing, since there is
be an equilibrium. Suppose that one firm increases its bid to some
willing to defect in such manner, since it then wins the auction with certainty, whereas the expected profits upon winning are hardly affected. Also, both winning firms are still able to find financing: for example, by both taking on debt
debtholders are willing to sign such contracts. The equilibrium thus necessarily has all bidders bidding b R , and the winners taking on debt levels d R .
Comparison with other allocation mechanisms
In this section we discuss the implications of our model for the outcome of the auction, and for the retail market equilibrium that results. In particular, we analyze the fees paid at the auction and the consumer price level in the equilibrium of our model. We compare fees and prices to those in alternative setups, such as a beauty contest or a standard auction without external financing.
We first argue that retail prices are decreasing in the amount of debt of the firms competing on the market.
Theorem 4 In the competition subgame, if both firms have the same debt level, and if that debt level increases, then equilibrium retail prices decrease:
Proof. This has been shown in the proof of Lemma 3.
Debt induces firms to compete more aggressively. Hence, higher debt implies lower prices.
(See e.g. Brander and Lewis, 1986) . Now consider the case of a beauty contest, in which licenses are allocated through some administrative mechanism, at a fee that equals zero.
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Corollary 1 A beauty contest leads to higher retail prices than the auction with external financing does.
Proof. With a beauty contest, d = 0. In the equilibrium of the auction with external
The result then follows from Proposition 4.
In the equilibrium of our model the debt level d R is strictly positive, whereas with a beauty contest licenses are given away for free and d = 0. Since firms compete more aggressively when they hold debt, retail prices are lower when licenses are auctioned than when they are given away for free in a beauty contest. Note that this result is opposite to what is often argued in the popular press: that auctions lead to higher retail prices, since firms have to "earn their money back". That argument boils down to a sunk-cost fallacy (see e.g. Klemperer, 2002a ). In our model, auctions lead to lower prices than beauty contests:
auctions lead to higher debt, and higher debt leads to lower prices.
Our results depend crucially on the strictly positive debt levels that result from the stage in which the licenses are awarded. For comparison, we now discuss what happens when firms do have sufficient internal funds.
Corollary 2 When firms have access to sufficient internal funds, license fees paid at an auction will be higher than when firms have to resort to external finance. Retail prices will also be higher.
The intuition is straightforward. The strategic effect of debt implies that firms that have debt compete more aggressively than firms that do not. As a result, their expected retail profits in equilibrium will be lower. With internal funds, expected retail profits are competed away in the auction. Hence, equilibrium bids equal E ω (π * (0, 0)). With positive debt levels, equilibrium bids are necessarily lower, as expected retail profits are lower.
Moreover, the firms' expected profits are not competed away completely. For both reasons, equilibrium bids in a model with internal funds are higher than those in a model with debt.
Also, equilibrium prices are higher. The intuition for that result is the same as in the case of a beauty contest.
A numerical example
In this section, we give a numerical example. We consider a Hotelling model with cost 
which implies that Property 3 holds. Alsô
In stage 3, firm i's expected net retail profits equal
Plugging inω i and π i (p i , p j , ω), this yields
Taking the first-order condition yields four possible solutions for p i :
Yet, plugging either p 1 i and p 2 i back into the numerator of (9) yields zero profits, which implies that these roots are not feasible. Note also that 1 + p j − p (1 + p j ) 2 + 24d i , which implies that when using p 3 i the denominator of (9) becomes negative, which implies negative profits. Therefore, p 4 i is the only relevant solution. From (8), we have that, evaluated in equilibrium,
In this case, we have price competition. The proof of Lemma 2 then implies that both p * i and p * j are decreasing in d j . Also note that d j does have a direct effect on the reaction function of firm j, but not on that of firm i. We thus have dp * i
This implies that the term ∂p * j /∂d j − dp * i /dd j in (10) is strictly positive. Since we require that π * i > 0 for all ω, we have p * i > ω. This implies that Property 1 holds. Suppose both firms have the same level of debt d. We can then solve for equilibrium prices to find
This implies that dπ * i /dd < 0 for all ω, so Property 2 holds as well. For the expected repayment to the debtholders, we have
With common d, we haveω
Note that the highest possible value for ω is 1. Hence, when d ≤ 1/4, the firms are always able to repay their debt. The restriction that π * i > 0 requires d < 1/2. We thus have:
Maximizing with respect to d yields
, and p * = p * 3 8 which is higher than in the model with debt, and expected firm profits are driven to zero.
An alternative specification
Above, we solved our model for the case in which more debt induces firms to compete more
aggressively. Yet, there are also cases in which more debt induces firms to compete less aggressively. Showalter (1995) shows that this is the case with Bertrand competition with differentiated products, and uncertainty about demand. It is interesting to see how this affects the outcome of our model. We study that issue in this section, and thus replace Property 3 with the following:
Marginal profit is strictly increasing in ω. That is,
We will discuss our results solely in terms of price competition, as we are not aware of any models with quantity competition for which Property 4 is satisfied. The proofs of Lemmas 6 through 9 below are straightforward variations on the equivalent lemmas in the analysis above, and are therefore omitted. All other proofs are in the appendix. In each lemma and theorem that follows, we impose Properties 1, 2, and 4 on the equilibrium profits of the competition stage.
First we have that a firm's reaction curve shifts outwards as its level of debt increases (Lemma 6). This causes a firm's retail profits to increase as its competitor's debt level increases (Lemma 7). The effect of an increase in the common debt level is also opposite to that in the previous section (Lemma 8).
Lemma 6 Having more debt induces a firm to compete less aggressively. That is,
dβ i dd i > 0 if d i ∈ [0,d i (d j )] = 0 if d i >d i (d j ).
Lemma 7 An increase in a firm's debt level increases the competitor's equilibrium retail profits:
∂π * i (d i , d j , ω) ∂d j > 0 if d i ∈ [0,d i (d j )], = 0 otherwise, ∀ω ∈ [ω,ω].
Lemma 8 An increase in the common debt level increases the expected retail profits of the firms:
dE ω (π * (d, d)) dd > 0 if d ∈ [0,d], = 0 otherwise.
Lemma 9 An increase in the amount of debt that a firm holds, increases the expected revenue for debtholders of the other firm:
The intuition is very similar to that in section 4. From Lemma 7, we now have that for every realization of ω, the retail profits of the other firm increase in d j . Hence, the probability that that firm will be able to repay its debt increases, as do the profits that debtholders can capture if the firm cannot fully repay its debt.
In this case, R(d, d) is strictly increasing on the relevant interval:
Lemma 10 Debtholder's revenue is strictly increasing in the common debt level: 
However, we now have:
Theorem 6 In the equilibrium described in Theorem 5, firms make zero expected net profits.
Theorem 7 The equilibrium described in Theorem 5 is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
Hence, we again have a unique symmetric equilibrium of the auction stage. All firms submit the same bid, and the firms that win the auction choose the same debt level. That debt level is a common debt level that maximizes expected repayment to the debtholders.
Yet, different from the previous case, debtholders' profits are driven to zero. At the auction stage, firms will increase their bids as long as they are still able to obtain financing, that is, up to the point where expected net profits of debtholders are zero.
The outcome is depicted in Figure 2 . Again, a firm's expected retail profits
are depicted as a function of a common debt level d. 
In this case, R is increasing for all d <d, which implies that d R =d. Intuitively, this can be seen as follows. Suppose that we have d =d. When we decrease d fromd to some lower value, firms will compete more aggressively. This hurts debtholders. Even if firms are able to repay their debt, debtholders receive a lower amount. Hence, R decreases.
Again, in equilibrium both firms submit b R , with the same argument as in the previous case. But now, since d R coincides withd, it no longer implies that firms have positive expected profits. There is no longer a moral hazard problem, as higher debt levels only increase equilibrium firm profits. Therefore, we no longer have credit rationing. Thus, if debt makes the output market less competitive, it does not affect the competitiveness of the auction.
It is easy to see that higher debt levels now imply higher retail prices. This directly implies that, in the set-up that we have here, retail prices will be lower with a beauty Figure 2 : Solving the alternative model. contest than they are with an auction with debt. Retail prices with an auction with internal funds are equal to those with a beauty contest, and lower than those with an auction with debt. From Figure 2 , it is also easy to see that auction revenues will be lower with internal funds than with debt.
Unfortunately, we are not able to provide a numerical example for this case. Solving a simple linear Hotelling model with demand uncertainty, for example, involves solving a fourth-order polynomial, for which we are not able to find an analytical solution.
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we considered license auctions in which winning firms have to take on debt in order to finance their bids. Since debt has a strategic effect in the aftermarket, it will also affect the outcome of the auction. In addition, the outcome of the auction determines the level of debt firms need to take on. We show that when debt induces firms to compete more aggressively, there is a negative relation between retailer prices and the fees paid at the auction. Thus, higher fees imply lower prices for consumers. Even though firms are completely symmetric, expected equilibrium profits are strictly positive. This is due to credit rationing. Winning bidders, even though they make positive expected profits, will not be outbid. Any higher bid would yield a debt level that implies negative expected net profits for debtholders, and therefore financing cannot be obtained. Retail prices are lower with an auction with debt than they are with a beauty contest or with an auction with internal funds. Thus, if debt makes the output market more competitive, then it makes the auction less competitive, in the sense that expected net profits are higher.
Our results change, however, when debt induces firms to compete less aggressively. In that case, there is no credit rationing, so expected firm profits are driven to zero. Retail prices are higher with an auction with debt than they are with a beauty contest, or with an auction with internal funds. Thus, if debt makes the output market less competitive, it does not affect the competitiveness of the auction.
These results suggest that, in auction design, it is important to realize how winners will finance their bids. When external finance is used, results from standard auction theory, implicitly based on internal finance, do not necessarily apply. However, it is not
straightforward to see what this implies for social welfare. In an auction with debt, prices may be lower in equilibrium, but the probability that firms go bankrupt increases.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Consider the case in which d i ≤d i (d j ). The first-order condition (FOC) for firm i in the competition stage is given by
Totally differentiating this expression yields
A similar equality holds for firm j. This system of two equations can be solved using
Cramer's rule to give
where (12) we then have that the sign of da i /dd i is the same as the sign of ∂ 2 Π i /∂d i ∂a i . To sign this expression, consider the FOC given by (11). From (1), and dropping the arguments ofω i , we have
where the second equality follows from the fact that
From (13), we obtain ∂
This derivative equals the product of three terms. We consider the sign of each in turn, starting with the last one. Differentiating (14) with respect to d i yields (15) is negative. The second term is clearly positive: f (ω i ) > 0, providedω i ∈ (ω,ω). Finally, consider the sign of the first term, ∂π i (a i , a j ,ω i ) /∂a i . From Assumption 3, we have
Thus, ∂π i (a i , a j , ω) /∂a i is decreasing in ω in case of quantity competition (a i ≡ q i ) and increasing in ω in case of price competition (a i ≡ p i ). Consider the integral in (13). With quantity competition, we have that the integrand is decreasing, and the integral equals zero.
This necessarily implies that the integrand is negative when evaluated in the upper limit of the integral, hence ∂π i (a i , a j ,ω i ) /∂a i < 0. From (15) (13) is increasing, while the integral is zero. This implies that the integrand is positive
In turn, this implies from (12) that indeed dβ i /dd i < 0. 
since a decrease in the competitor's price decreases this firm's profits, as products are substitutes. Also, Thus, using (3) ,
where the second equality follows from the fact that π * 
since an increase in the competitor's quantity decreases this firm's profits. Also, Again, using (3) and Assumption 1, this implies that
, the result is trivial. By assumption, an increase in d i does not affect a i , hence it does not affect a j , so profits will also be unaffected.
Proof of Lemma 3
First consider the case of price competition. From Lemma 1, an increase in firm i's debt level shifts its best-reply function downwards. Since best-reply functions are upward sloping, firms are symmetric, and
decrease equilibrium prices for both firms: dp *
Thus, p m is the price that, if set by both firms, maximizes their expected retail profits. Note that expected retail profits are equal to firm profits in the case of zero debt: (p, p, 0) . Using symmetry between the two firms and the condition for stability of the Nash equilibrium, we then have that
Obviously, the equilibrium price in a duopoly is strictly lower than the price that maximizes joint profits,
. With dp *
For the case of quantity competition, we have that best-reply functions are downward sloping and, from Lemma 1, that an increase in d leads to an upward shift in a firm's bestreply function. Hence, equilibrium quantities q *
Thus, q m is the price that, if set by each individual firm, maximizes the firms' expected retail profits. Concavity of π(q, q) implies that E ω (π(q, q)) is decreasing in q for q > q m . Obviously, the equilibrium quantity a firm sets in a duopoly is strictly higher than the quantity each firm sets when joint profits are maximized
Plugging this into the FOC of joint-profit maximization yields
as ∂Π i /∂p j > 0, since an increase in js price will increase is profits. Strict concavity then implies that the joint-profit maximizing price p m is strictly higher than p * . 14 Formally, note that q * (0, 0) solves
Proof of Lemma 4 Using Leibniz's rule, from (2) the partial derivative of
with respect to d j is given by
is the probability density function of ω, the first and second terms cancel out. Thus, only the third term remains. This term is negative because of Lemma 2. For d j >d j , a change in d j does not affect a * j , which implies that
Proof of Lemma 5 Since
and from Lemma 4 that
Proof of Theorem 1 To prove that this is an equilibrium, we need that the three conditions in definition 1 are satisfied. Equilibrium at the competition stage holds by definition for the a * i defined in the Theorem. For the debt stage, we need to show that (d R , d R ) is an equilibrium, given that both firms have submitted a bid b R in the auction stage. For the auction stage, we need to show that no firm is willing to submit a higher bid and that firms submitting b R make nonnegative profits.
Consider the debt stage. Equilibrium debts (d 1 , d 2 ) have to satisfy
as ∂Π i /∂q j < 0, since an increase in js quantity will decrease is profits. Strict concavity then implies that the joint-profit maximizing quantity q m is strictly lower than q * .
and
Consider firm 1's best reply to
we have from Lemma 5 that contradicting (17) . Consider the possibility to set Hence, a firm cannot strictly improve by submitting a lower bid and losing the auction.
Consider a firm that defects by submitting a bid b > b R , so we have some b 1 > b R and
The conditions (6) imply that to be able to obtain financing for both firms in the new situation, we need to find a (d 1 , d 2 ) such that
The argument proceeds with the following steps:
There is no such
we consider two subcases. 
Using Leibniz's rule and dropping the arguments ofω, we have
/∂ω, the first and third terms cancel out, so
Consider the case in which d = 0. Then,ω(d, d) =ω, so we have
Consider the case in which
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3. Combining (22) and (23) Proof of Corollary 2 In our model, equilibrium license fees are
With internal funds, since all firms are identical and information is symmetric, profits will be competed away at the auction stage. The license fees paid in equilibrium are Proof of Theorem 5 To prove that this is an equilibrium, we need that the three conditions in definition 1 are satisfied. Equilibrium at the competition stage holds trivially.
For the debt stage, we need to show that (d R , d R ) is an equilibrium, given that both firms have submitted a bid b R in the auction stage. For the auction stage, we need to show that no firm is willing to submit a higher bid and that firms submitting b R make nonnegative profits.
and 
The argument proceeds in the following steps: In that case, firm 1's profits would even be higher, using 7. This implies that a case in which all firms bid the same b < b R is not a Nash equilibrium.
